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I. INTRODUCTION 
The planned entry of the U.S. into the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) poses a unique Constitutional problem. The problem is 
that the President lacks constitutional authority to bind the U.S. to the 
agreement without congressional consent; but that lack of authority may not 
prevent the U.S. from being bound to the agreement under international 
                                                 
1
 Professorial Lecturer, Associate Director, Program on Information Justice and 
Intellectual Property, American University Washington College of Law, 
Sflynn@wcl.american.edu; 202-274-4157. Thanks go to Oona Hathaway and Amy 
Kapczynski for their many helpful comments and discussions. Errors, of course, are my 
own. 
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law. If the administration succeeds in its plan, ACTA may be a binding 
international treaty (under international law) that is not a treaty (under U.S. 
Constitutional law).  
There is a growing academic literature documenting and analyzing the 
recent shift of international law making by the U.S. toward the use of 
“executive agreements.” The term refers to binding international 
agreements entered by the President without engaging the treaty clause of 
the Constitution.
2
 Academics are divided on whether the growth of the 
practice of entering international treaties by executive agreement is good or 
bad for local and international democracy and public policy.
3
 But their 
focus has been mainly on the particular subset of executive agreements 
known as Congressional-Executive agreements. In such agreements, 
Congress either authorizes the President to negotiate the subject matter of 
the agreement ex ante, or it approves the text of the agreement with 
legislation passing both houses ex post (rather the two thirds senate 
approval required for a treaty). Congress thus retains a key role in 
consenting to the agreement in question.  
There has been much less scholarly attention to the particular subset of 
executive agreements, known as “sole executive agreements,” represented 
by ACTA.
4
 Since the early days of the U.S. involvement in ACTA‟s 
negotiation, first under President Bush and now under President Obama, the 
Administration‟s position has been that it can enter ACTA without any 
Congressional involvement at all, ex ante or ex post.
5
 This is a bold claim 
                                                 
2
 [String cite.] 
3
 Compare Oona Hathaway (criticizing) and John Yu (celebrating). 
4
 Cite articles specifically on sole exec agreements. 
5
 See http://www.acslaw.org/node/15774; http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2010/lets-
make-deal-will-acta-force-end-executive-
agreements?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A%20
CitizenMediaLawProject%20%28Citizen%20Media%20Law%20Project%29On the 
definition of a “treaty” under international law, see Vienna Convention on the 
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which has drawn criticism from numerous legal experts.
6
 But, as of this 
writing, the administration has not articulated a plan for implementing 
ACTA that includes congressional approval. 
This course of action charts new ground. Entering international 
agreements containing minimum standards on intellectual property 
legislation has become fairly routine since 1992.
7
 In the majority of these 
agreements, as with ACTA, the intellectual property provisions were 
entered with commitments that they would not alter existing U.S. law.
8
 But 
the agreements were nevertheless submitted for Congressional approval. 
Thus far, every international minimum standards agreement on intellectual 
property law has been consented to by Congress, either through ex ante 
authorization, ex post consent, or as a treaty.
9
  
The reason congressional approval is required for intellectual property 
agreements is that the power to regulate this subject, along with interstate 
                                                                                                                            
Interpretation of Treaties Art. __. Cf 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101117/12403111915/as-us-insists-acta-is-not-a-treaty-
eu-trade-commissioner-admits-it-s-a-treaty.shtml 
6
 See Over 75 Law Profs Call for Halt of ACTA, PIJIP BLOG (Oct. 28, 2010), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/over-75-law-profs-call-for-halt-of-acta; 
Jack Goldsmith and Lawrence Lessig, Anti-counterfeiting agreement raises constitutional 
concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2010 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/25/AR2010032502403.html; Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The 
Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement on the Knowledge Economy: The 
Accountability of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for the Creation of IP 
Enforcement Norms Through Executive Trade Agreements, 35 YALE J. INT‟L L. 24 (Fall 
2009). 
7
 NAFTA 
8
 [filli n news article quoting USTR on FTA provisions being consistent with US law, 
e.g. Korea, Australia, Peru]. The WTO TRIPS agreement is the major counter example. 
TRIPS required several alterations of U.S. intellectual property law, including an alteration 
in how the U.S. calculates patent terms. 
9
 Cf [articles discussing entry into WTO as an executive agreement]; [inside US trade 
on plans to submit . 
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and foreign commerce, is an enumerated power of Congress (through 
legislation in which the President participates) under Article I Section 8 of 
the Constitution. To make policy in any area expressly delegated to 
Congress requires Congressional participation. Sole executive agreements 
are valid only in areas of policy exclusively under the President‟s control – 
for example in incidents of his authority as commander in chief or to accept 
ambassadors from foreign nations.
10
 The President does not have sole 
executive authority to make intellectual property law, and so he cannot bind 
the U.S. to an intellectual property agreement without congressional 
approval. 
There have been reports that the Administration is embracing the 
constitutional ambiguity of ACTA by telling Congressional offices, as a 
justification for their continued inaction, that ACTA will not be a binding 
agreement in the U.S. without congressional ratification.
11
 That is only 
partly true. ACTA cannot bind the U.S. under U.S. law. But under 
international law the President can create binding treaties by expressing his 
intent regardless of what U.S. domestic law says about the required 
ratification process.
12
 ACTA‟s legal status under international law can alter 
U.S. law even without congressional ratification. Courts may use ACTA to 
interpret ambiguous commands in domestic law.
13
 It may become a 
blueprint for future agreements and for domestic and international policy 
laundering efforts.
14
 And until the administration‟s descriptions of ACTA as 
an “executive agreement” are rejected by courts, the agreement could have 
                                                 
10
 See Art. II Sec. __ 
11
 Private communication with James Love, Knowledge Ecology International. 
12
 See VCLT art. 27 (stating that “a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”). The fact that ACTA will bind 
interntionally, even if not domestically, may account for the relative paucity of complaints 
from ACTA negotiating countries about the U.S. driving the drafting of a treaty it does not 
intend be bound to. Cf http://keionline.org/node/993 
13
 See Charming Betsy 
14
 [define and cite to policy laundering] 
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the practical effects of a valid executive agreement, including preemption of 
state law. 
To avoid this state of affairs, the Administration needs to make clear to 
our treaty partners that the United States does not consider itself to be 
bound until ACTA is consented to by Congress or domestic legislation 
implementing the agreement is passed. Absent that clarification, the U.S. 
will break new ground – for the first time entering an agreement setting 
expansive international standards for U.S. intellectual property legislation 
without Congress‟s approval. 
This article explains each of these points in more depth. Part II describes 
the elements of ACTA which usurp congressional authority by setting new 
international minimum standards on a broad range of domestic intellectual 
property laws. Part III explains the U.S. Constitutional requirements for 
U.S. entry into binding international agreements and how the current plan 
for entering ACTA without congressional consent fails to abide by those 
norms. Part IV describes the international law on treaty making which 
would render ACTA a binding international treaty even absent 
congressional consent. The conclusion describes the limited options 
available to prevent U.S. entry into ACTA as a binding international treaty 
which is not a binding treaty under U.S. law.    
II. ACTA REGULATES DOMESTIC INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGISLATION  
ACTA is a proposed plurilateral international agreement between 
Australia, Canada, the 27 countries of the European Union (EU), Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland and the 
United States of America. A key aim of the agreement is to define and 
require adherence of domestic law to “a state-of-the-art international 
framework” of minimum standards in intellectual property and customs 
legislation.
15
 Although the parties negotiating the agreement are highly 
                                                 
15
 USTR Briefing Paper. See also Fact Sheet: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA), EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Nov. 2008), 
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unrepresentative of the world at large,
16
 the agreement seeks to establish 
global minimum standards applicable to developing as well as developed 
countries.
17
  
All of the negotiating countries of ACTA are members of the World 
Trade Organization and therefore signatories to the WTO‟s agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
Enforcement of intellectual property laws was a central concern of TRIPS, 
primarily expressed in Part III. ACTA is essentially a re-write of TRIPS 
Part III “to set a new, higher benchmark for intellectual property rights 
                                                                                                                            
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140836.11.08.pdf (describing 
ACTA as “being for the purpose of establishing international standards on intellectual 
property rights enforcement”). 
16
 Using Immanuel Wallerstein‟s “World Systems” typology: all but two of the 
negotiating countries are part of the high income and highly industrialized “core” of the 
world system; two, Mexico and Morocco, are part of the second tier of middle income 
rapidly industrializing countries. The majority of the world‟s countries and population 
centers which reside in the periphery of the world system are not represented at all. Cf. 
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD ECONOMY (1979); Immanuel 
Wallerstein, Globalization or the age of transition? A long term view of the trajectory of 
the world system, 15 INT‟L SOCIOLOGY 249-265 (2000).  
17
 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,  MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF 
NEW ZEALAND, (2008) 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/ContentTopicSummary____34357.aspx (“The goal of 
ACTA is to set a new, higher benchmark for intellectual property rights enforcement that 
countries can join on a voluntary basis.”) [hereinafter New Zealand ACTA]; See Proposed 
U.S. ACTA Multi-Lateral Intellectual Property Trade Agreement, 
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/G-
8_plurilateral_intellectual_property_trade_agreement_discussion_paper (proposing 
“[s]pecial measures for developing countries in the initial phase”); U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 4 (2008), 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf (“ACTA is 
envisioned as a leadership effort among countries that will raise the international standard 
for IPR enforcement”). 
7 PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-XX 
 
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP 
enforcement.”18  
The final agreement contains 24 single spaced pages, the majority of 
which create a new minimum “Legal Framework for Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights.”19 The Legal framework chapter contains new 
“TRIPS-plus”20 requirements for minimum legislative enactments covering 
all intellectual property rights contained in TRIPS.
21
 This includes patents, 
copyrights and trademarks, industrial designs, geographical indications, 
layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits, pharmaceutical and 
agricultural test data, sui generis protection of plant varieties, and trade 
secrets.
22
 For U.S. law the list is significant not only in its breadth, but 
because it covers areas like trade secrets and remedies that are often 
addressed by State as well as Federal law.
23
 
                                                 
18
 New Zealand ACTA, supra note 5. See James Love, ACTA and Part III of TRIPS 
Compared by Frequency of Terms, KEI (Sept. 10, 2010), http://keionline.org/node/940 
(noting, for example, that TRIPS Part III contains 3,001 words, as compared to 10,383 in 
the August leaked text of ACTA). 
19
 ACTA, Chapter 2. 
20
 “TRIPS-plus” is an informal term used in international intellectual property 
discussions to refer to minimum legal standards in national or international laws that 
exceed the baseline requirements of the TRIPS agreement. See, e.g., Pedro Roffe,  Bilateral 
agreements and a TRIPS-plus world: the Chile-USA Free Trade Agreement, QIAP (Oct. 
2004), http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/Bilateral-Agreements-and-
TRIPS-plus-English.pdf. USTR negotiator Stan McCoy has referred to the goal of ACTA s 
being to create a “[quote from McCoy from his affidavit quoted in Yu, Six Secret Fears]”. 
21
 See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal Predecisional/Deliberative 
Draft:  Oct. 2, 2010, Section B, Art. 1.X: Definitions, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, 
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Official Text -- October 2, 2010” 
hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Oct. 2, 2010].  
22
 See James Love, The October 2, 2010 version of the ACTA text, KEI (Oct. 7, 2010) 
http://keionline.org/node/962 (Noting that “this covers a lot of ground;” “The broad 
inclusion of all of these intellectual property rights in ACTA creates unintended 
consequences, as some of the enforcement provisions make no sense outside of the context 
of copyrights and trademarks.”). 
23
 See Letter from Forum on Democracy and Trade to Ambassador Kirk, available at 
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Within this broad field of domestic laws, ACTA regulates a diverse 
array of liability, remedy and law enforcement legal standards. The areas of 
law regulated by ACTA include the availability of, and evidentiary 
standards for, injunctions (including third party injunctions and ex party 
preliminary injunctions),
24
 damages (including “pre-established” 
damages),
25
 duties to divulge confidential information to the government,
26
 
seizures and destructions of goods (both before and after determinations of 
violation),
27
 border searches and detentions, including of “small 
consignments,”28 criminal liability, including for infringements of copyright 
that bestow any “indirect economic or commercial advantage,”29 liability 
for infringement on the internet,
30
 and liability for acts or products that 
circumvent technological or digital locks against copying.
31
  
The areas of domestic policy regulated by ACTA are broader still. 
Intellectual property doctrines do not exist for their own sake. They are 
created and tailored to serve numerous diverse public interests, and are 
limited by such ends. Establishing legal frameworks on the enforcement of 
intellectual property impacts domestic policies on health, access to 
information, free expression, innovation, production of and access to 
cultural products, competition, consumer protection and a myriad of other 
domestic policies.
32
 
                                                                                                                            
pijip.org. 
24
 See ACTA Draft – Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 8 at Section 2, Art. 2.X; 2.5. 
25
 See Id. at Section 2, Art. 2.2. 
26
 See Id. at Section 2, Art. 2.4. 
27
 See Id. at Section 2, Art. 2.3; 2.5(3). Section 3, Art. 2.16. 
28
 See Id. at Section 3: Border Measures. See also Art. 2.10 and 2.11 (requiring 
destruction of goods after a “determination” of violation by a “competent authority,” which 
need not be a court or other body following strict due process norms).  
29
 See Id. at Section 4, Art. 2.14. 
30
 See Id. at Section 5. 
31
 See Id. at Art. 2.18(5-7). 
32
 See Bernt Hugenholtz, [statement to ACTA meeting at WCL, June 2010, available 
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ACTA exports one particular model of how these various interests 
should be balanced through law. The model is identifiably that of the U.S., 
E.U. and Japan of the last quarter century. [expand]. Even in those countries 
in which the ACTA framework is largely enshrined in law, many of the 
elements are subject to proposlas for revision, including in ways that may 
violate ACTA‟s terms.33  
ACTA has been drafted under unusual levels of secrecy for a legislative 
minimum standards agreement. In the normal forums for international 
intellectual property law making – such as in the World Intellectual 
Property Organization and in the WTO – draft texts are regularly released 
during negotiating rounds and civil society groups can be accredited to 
participate in meetings and workshops. WIPO has recently embarked on the 
implementation of a “development agenda” in which participation processes 
are to be expanded. Agenda items adopted by the WIPO General Assembly 
call for all intellectual property norm-setting activities to: “be inclusive and 
member-driven; take into account different levels of development; take into 
consideration a balance between costs and benefits; be a participatory 
process, which takes into consideration the interests and priorities of all 
WIPO Member States and the viewpoints of other stakeholders, including 
accredited inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and NGOs; and be in 
line with the principle of neutrality of the WIPO Secretariat.”34 The 
negotiation of ACTA has taken place through a process that was nearly the 
opposite of these norms. ACTA was negotiated under a bilateral trade 
agreement model in which negotiations were held secretly,
35
 text was not 
released before or after most negotiating rounds, meetings with stakeholders 
                                                                                                                            
at pijip.org]. 
33
 See Pamual Samualson [article with Terra __ on stat damages] [Fill in critiques of 
DMCA in academic articlers and by NGOs such as EFF].  
34
 http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html, no. 15. 
35
 In many cases the city and country of the negotiation was not even released until 
days before the meeting. 
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took place only behind closed doors and off the record.
36
 The locking out of 
public participation was a deliberate strategy, particularly by the U.S. 
Officials at USTR hatched a plan, largely implemented, to deal with 
demands for transparency in ACTA negotiations by in the incoming Obama 
administration through the creation of a “transparency soup.” The plans 
included announcing “open door” policies to meet with anyone while 
saying little or nothing for the public record and actively thwarting the 
release of negotiating text or holding of public meetings until all decisions 
were made.
37
 
As the text of ACTA was gradually leaked, and then officially released, 
during the last year of the negotiation, the substance of ACTA came under 
broad criticism. In June 2010, nearly 650 international intellectual property 
experts and public interest organizations from six continents adopted a 
sharply worded public statement criticizing the proposal as “a threat to 
numerous public interests,” including to freedom on the internet, basic civil 
liberties including privacy and free expression, free trade in generic 
medicines, and to the policy balances between protection and acces that lie 
at heart of all intellectual property doctrines.
38
 A group of nearly 80 
intellectual property law professors later reviewed the final text of the 
agreement and reported that “it is clear that ACTA would usurp 
                                                 
36
 See ACTA Update, WITA (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.wita.org/en/cev/1126 
(featuring USTR chief ACTA negotiator Kira Alvarez, “appearing off-the-record”). 
37
 See James Love, USTR’s February 10, 2009 memo on Transparency Soup, KEI 
(Sept. 8, 2010), http://keionline.org/node/929; Mike Masnick, Transparency Pea Soup: The 
USTR Planned From The Beginning How Not To Be Transparent On ACTA, TECHDIRT 
(Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100909/05374310954.shtml. See also 
Masnick, Obama Administration Claims Copyright Treaty Involves State Secrets?!?, 
TECHDIRT (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090313/1456154113.shtml.  
38
 Text of Urgent ACTA Communique, International Experts Find That Pending Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Threatens Public Interests, PROGRAM ON INFORMATION 
JUSTICE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (June 23, 2010) 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique. 
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congressional authority over intellectual property policy in a number of 
ways.” The letter specifically noted 
Some of ACTA‟s provisions fail to explicitly incorporate current 
congressional policy, particularly in the areas of damages and injunctions.
39
 
Other sections lock in substantive law that may not be well-adapted to the 
present context, much less the future.
40
 And in other areas, the agreement may 
complicate legislative efforts to solve widely recognized policy dilemmas, 
including in the area of orphan works, patent reform, secondary copyright 
liability and the creation of incentives for innovation in areas where the patent 
system may not be adequate.
41
 The agreement is also likely to affect courts‟ 
interpretation of U.S. law.
42
  
According to the negotiating parties, the drafting of ACTA is now 
completed. A meeting was held in Australia in which the final text was 
submitted for “legal verification of the drafting,” and the agreement, as of 
this writing, is “now ready to be submitted to the participants‟ respective 
                                                 
39
 See Letter from Senator Bernard Sanders and Senator Sherrod Brown to David 
Kappos, Director of Patent and Trademark Office (Oct. 19, 2010), available at 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/senator_sanders_brown_kappos_19oct2010.pdf 
(requesting analysis on the potential implications of ACTA on areas of U.S. law that appear 
in conflict with the facial language of the agreement, including in reference to sovereign 
immunity); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999) (limitations of patent remedies against medical providers under 35 U.S.C. § 287 (c), 
and for non-disclosed patents on biologic products 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(6)(B)-(C), for non-
willful trademark violation, 15 U.S.C. § 114 (2), and in certain cases of infringement in the 
digital environment, 17 U.S.C. § 512).  
40 See ACTA Draft – Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 18 at art. 2.14.1(extending criminal 
copyright liability for any violations that bestow an “indirect” economic advantage). 
41 See Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S.2913, 110th Cong. (as passed by 
Senate, Sept. 26, 2008; World Health Assembly Res. 61.21, Global strategy and plan of 
action on public health, innovation and intellectual property, 61st Sess., May 19-24, 2008 
(May 24, 2008); ACTA Draft – Oct. 2, 2010 Draft, supra note 18 at art. 2.14(1,4) (applying 
broad conception of aid-and-abet liability). 
42 See generally Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (holding 
that U.S. statutes should be interpreted to avoid conflicts with international law). 
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authorities to undertake relevant domestic processes.”43 
And that is where this story begins.  
In many of the countries negotiating the agreement, including the EU, 
the normal procedures for entering a treaty, including consent by the 
legislative branch, will be used.
44
 But not in the U.S. The USTR has stated 
repeatedly that ACTA will enter into force in the U.S. as an executive 
agreement that does not require any congressional role.
45
 Thus, USTR 
argues, the agreement will be binding on the U.S. once Ambassador Kirk, 
as the U.S. negotiating representative, agrees to it. Congress will not receive 
the opportunity to review and amend the agreement before it goes into 
effect, as it would in any traditional international agreement binding on the 
U.S.
46
 If USTR succeeds in this bold plan, it will dramatically expand 
presidential power to make internationally binding law without 
congressional consent.  
III. ACTA IS NOT A BINDING TREATY (OR AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT) 
UNDER U.S. LAW 
The process that has been described by USTR for entering ACTA – 
including not submitting it to Congress for ratification – is insufficient to 
bind the U.S. to the agreement under U.S. law. The definition of a “finely 
wrought” system for the creation of binding law is a core subject of the 
Constitution.
47
 The Supremacy Clause describes the “supreme Law of the 
                                                 
43
 http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/november/us-
participants-finalize-anti-counterfeiting-trad 
44
 See European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2010 on the transparency and 
state of play of the ACTA negotiations, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Mar. 10, 2010) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-
0058&language=EN&ring=P7-RC-2010-0154 (asserting that “as a result of the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, [the EU Parliament] will have to give its consent to the ACTA 
Treaty text prior to its entry into force in the EU”).  
45
 See Katz & Hinze, supra note 2.  
46
 See [cite] 
47
 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) at 951. 
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Land” as being made up of the “Constitution,” “Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof,” and “Treaties.” These are the 
forms, and only forms, of binding federal law.  
There are three types of international agreement that can bind the U.S. 
under Constitutional standards: traditional treaties, confirmed by two thirds 
of the senate; executive agreements entered under congressionally delegated 
(ex ante) authority or approved in legislation after the fact; and sole 
executive agreements entered under the President‟s own authority. ACTA is 
none of these.  
A. Treaties Bind the U.S. Only With Senate Consent 
The first and most obvious place to find the power to bind the U.S. to an 
international agreement is through the treaty power. Article II gives the 
President the power to “make” treaties. But such agreements become part of 
the supreme law of the United States only with the consent of a two thirds 
vote of the Senate.
48
  
The USTR is not claiming that it has any intent to ask the Senate to 
approve ACTA as a treaty. So its lawmaking power must lie in recognition 
of ACTA as one of two types of executive agreements that bind as “Laws of 
the United States.”  
B. Congressional-Executive Agreements Bind Only by Virtue of 
Underlying Legislative Grants 
So-called “congressional-executive” agreements become binding law by 
virtue of having complied with Article I‟s lawmaking process. Since 
Congress has the expressly delegated Article I power to regulate foreign 
commerce, it can implement legal changes to international trade laws 
through statute as well as treaty.
49
 In a congressional-executive agreement, 
                                                 
48
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.  
49
 See John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-
Executive Agreements 56 (2000) available at http://works.bepress.com/johnyoo/24  
(noting, e.g., that a statute reducing tariffs or changing customs laws would be no less a 
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Congress passes through both houses, and the President signs, legislation 
either delegating ex ante authority to enter agreements or approving of the 
agreement itself ex post.  
There is academic debate as to the extent to which Congress should 
delegate so much authority to the President to make law through 
congressional-executive agreements, particularly through the vague and 
open ended delegations of ex ante authority that has become common in 
modern times.
50
 But it is generally accepted that our positive law recognizes 
such agreements as binding proclamations of law.
51
 And even the strong 
executive camp recognizes that congressional participation through a 
congressional-executive agreement is the bare constitutional minimum for 
the legal validity of any agreement on a matter relating to an Article I, 
Section 8 power.
52
  
The USTR does not claim that Congress has authorized the negotiation 
of ACTA through an ex ante statutory grant of authority. And it has stated 
that it does not plan to ask the U.S. Congress to approve ACTA ex post. It 
must therefore rely on the validity of ACTA as a sole executive agreement.  
                                                                                                                            
statement of binding law in the U.S. than a treaty doing the same) [hereinafter YOO 
ARTICLE]. [pages reference working paper version. Paper published in 99 Mich. L. Rev. 
757]. 
50
 Compare Yoo Article, supra note 35 at 4 (supporting congressional-executive 
agreements as a means to “preserve Congress‟s constitutional powers over matters such as 
international commerce”) with Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International 
Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 146 (2009) (criticizing the growth of 
congressional-executive agreements as “inconsistent with basic democratic principles”). 
51
 See Cong. Research Serv., S. Prt. 106-71, Treaties and Other International 
Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter Senate Report]. 
But see Laurence Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form 
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221 (1995) (arguing 
congressional-executive agreements violate the Treaty Clause). 
52
 Yoo Article, supra note 35 at 56 (“Not only are congressional-executive agreements 
acceptable, but in areas of Congress‟s Article I, Section 8 powers, they are – in a sense –
constitutionally required.”). See also Section III(C) & (D) below. 
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C. Sole Executive Agreements Bind Only in Matters Delegated to the 
Unilateral Power of the President 
In a “sole executive agreement,” the President binds the U.S. to an 
international agreement unilaterally – with no formal ex ante or ex post 
authorization by Congress. This is the form of agreement represented by 
ACTA. But this claim is highly dubious because of the “strict legal limits 
[that] govern the kinds of agreements that presidents may enter into” 
without some form of Congressional consent.
53
  
Because sole executive agreements “lack an underlying legal basis in 
the form of a statute or treaty,”54 they can be made by the president only 
within the restrictive set of circumstances in which the President has 
independent Constitutional authority.
55
 “The President cannot make an 
international agreement that exceeds his own constitutional authority 
without Congress‟s assent.”56   
Most binding domestic law must flow from the shared responsibilities 
described in Article I. Article II, however, provides for the exercise of 
certain powers by the President unilaterally. Such acts, performed within 
the bounds of Constitutionally delegated power, “have as much legal 
                                                 
53
 Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law, supra note 36 at 146. 
54
 Senate Report, supra note 37, at 88. 
55
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
303(4) (1986) (The President may enter a binding international agreement without 
congressional assent only for a “matter that falls within his independent powers under the 
Constitution.”); see Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (admonishing that when 
the President acts pursuant to an “express or implied authorization of Congress, his 
authority is at its maximum”; but “in absence of either a constitutional grant or denial of 
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers”).  
56
 Statement of Professor Oona A. Hathaway, Yale Law School, Before the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia and the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight (Mar. 4, 
2008), http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/hat030408.htm. 
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validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature.”57 For 
Supremacy clause purposes, “[s]ole executive agreements validly concluded 
pursuant to one or more of the President‟s independent powers under 
Article II of the Constitution may be accorded status as Supreme Law of the 
Land.”58 Thus, if ACTA is a validly executed sole executive agreement, 
then ACTA would preempt contrary state law,
59
 and may even supersede an 
existing federal statute.
60
 
The authority to enter sole executive agreements can be most easily and 
commonly found in the parts of the Constitution that grant the President 
independent power to act without Congressional participation. Thus, many 
executive agreements are uncontroversial extensions of the President‟s 
independent authority to act as Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy,
61
 to “receive ambassadors” from (and thereby recognize) foreign 
nations,
62
 or to issue pardons.
63
 There are also a large number of (often 
                                                 
57
 Pink v. United States, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (citing The Federalist No. 64 (Jay) 
(describing the equal legal validity of “[a]ll Constitutional acts of power, whether in the 
executive or in the judicial department”). 
58
 Senate Report, supra note 37, at 92. 
59
 See Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (Preemption of state law 
could be a real concern over the areas of intellectual property law, particularly trade secret 
law, administered primarily through state common law).  
60
 See Senate Report, supra note 37, at 95 (analyzing case law and finding that “the 
question as to the effect of a Presidential agreement upon a prior conflicting act of 
Congress has apparently not yet been completely settled”) (internal quotation and citation 
removed); see also Restatement at Sec. 115, Reporter‟s Note 5 (explaining arguments that 
because a sole executive agreement “is Federal law,” and all valid Federal laws are of equal 
weight, a sole executive agreement could be interpreted “to supersede a statute”). But see 
United States v. Guy Capps, Inc., 204 F. 2d 655, 659-660 (4th Cir. 1953), aff’d on other 
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955) (“whatever the power of the executive with respect to 
making executive trade agreements regulating foreign commerce in the absence of action 
by Congress, it is clear that the executive may not through entering into such an agreement 
avoid complying with a regulation prescribed by Congress‟‟). 
61
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
62
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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mundane)
64
 executive agreements grounded in the President‟s general 
power “to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”65 In a small 
number of other borderline cases, long historical practice of acquiescence 
by Congress has been used to justify sole executive action to settle foreign 
claims that otherwise implicate congressional powers.
66
  
None of the settled cases apply to ACTA. If the agreement was 
composed only of the kind of coordination and information exchange 
between customs offices contained in part __, perhaps the agreement could 
be justified as an incident to the President‟s executive power to manage 
agencies in their implementation of law. But the information sharing and 
international cooperation mandates of ACTA make up just a couple of 
ACTA‟s pages.67 The majority of ACTA is composed of specific provisions 
on intellectual property remedies that the legislation of each country must 
adhere to. This cannot be justified as an implementation of mere executive 
                                                                                                                            
63
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law, 
supra note 36 (citing “defense” as the area of foreign policy with the most executive 
agreements); Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1573, 1581-82 (2007) (describing the “vast majority” of sole executive agreements as 
“unobjectionable . . . means of exercising their independent statutory authority or 
constitutional powers, such as the power to receive ambassadors, to issue pardons, or to 
command the military forces”) (citing examples). 
64
 Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law, supra note 36 at 149. 
65
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See Hathaway, Presidential Power Over International Law, 
supra note 36 at 149-153 & n. 29 (finding 375 sole executive agreements between 1990 
and 2000 on matters including “Agreed Minutes” and “Implementing Procedures”). Cf. 
Van Alstine 319 n. 61, 352, n. 285 (citing over 15,000 executive agreements between 1946 
and 2004). 
66
 See Pink v. United States, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); SENATE REPORT, supra note 37 at 
90; Clark, supra note 49 at 1582, 1615 & 1660 (noting examples including receiving 
ambassadors, issuing pardons, settling claims of American nationals against foreign 
governments, and conducting military exercises). 
67
 See Chapter Three, Enforcement Practices and Chapter Four, International 
Cooperation, ACTA PP. 17-20. 
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power. “In the framework of our Constitution, the President‟s power to see 
to it that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a 
lawmaker.”68 Thus, the USTR must be locating the power to bind U.S. 
legislation to ACTA‟s dictates to some unenumerated power.  
Claims to unenumerated powers to conduct foreign affairs without 
congressional participation reached its zenith in the George W. Bush 
administration.
69
 Those in favor of strong executive power argue that 
extensive unenumerated powers in matters of foreign affairs should vest in 
the sole discretion of the executive.
70
 But “uncertainties and the sources of 
controversy about the constitutional blueprint lie in what the Constitution 
does not say.”71 Even the adherents to the strong executive theory accept 
that the President cannot use a sole executive agreement to usurp 
lawmaking functions from Congress in any area expressly delegated to 
Congress by Article I.
72
 And that is the source of the constitutional problem 
with ACTA.  
D. ACTA Implicates Article I Powers 
ACTA does not deal with issues that lie in the unenumerated lacunae of 
                                                 
68
 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. 
69
 See VanAlstine at 312, n. 8; Curtis Bradley & Martin Flaherty, Exec. Power 
Essentialism & Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH L. REV. 545, 548 (2004). 
70
 See Memorandum from John Yoo to John Bellinger, 13  (Nov. 15, 2001) (“the 
executive exercises all unenumerated powers related to treaty making”); see also John 
Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1677-78 (2002); Van 
Alstine, 54 UCLA L. Rev at 337-340 (describing the strong claim that Article II‟s “vesting 
clause” grants plenary powers to the President over foreign affairs). 
71
 See Henkin at 753 (emphasis added). 
72
 See YOO ARTICLE, supra note 35 at 56-58; Saikrishna Prakash & Michael D. 
Ramsey, The Exec. Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L. J. 231, 253 (2001). See also 
Van Alstine, 342-43 (“[E]ven the strong claim to implied executive powers acknowledges, 
as it must, that the president‟s Article II powers are „residual‟ only. Whatever their general 
scope, they are qualified by, and otherwise must yield to, the more specific allocations of 
power elsewhere in Article II and in Article I.”).  
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the Constitution. As described above in Part __, ACTA is a wide ranging 
international agreement mandating statutory minimum standards in areas of 
federal and state law. ACTA standards would place restraints on the 
development of rules that stem from the Constitution itself, such as in the 
evidentiary standards required for property seizures and criminal 
prosecution. It would affect state common law, where many trade secret 
obligations reside. And primarily it would affect the evolution of federal 
law, including the large federal statutory enactments on patents, copyrights 
and trademarks. 
As an agreement setting minimum legislative standards for intellectual 
property law and the regulation of IP-protected goods on the internet and in 
international trade, ACTA directly implicates Congress‟s Article I, Section 
8 powers. These include, most specifically, those to “regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations” and “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Indeed, the only 
mention of “piracies” and “counterfeiting” in the Constitution are in Article 
I, Section 8, although the Founders were not speaking of copyright and 
trademark infringement.
73
  
There is no residuum of power in these areas that the executive can 
claim, even under the broadest theories of the strong executive camp. Thus 
John Yoo, one of the leaders of the strong executive camp, explains: 
In order to respect the Constitution‟s grant of plenary power to Congress, 
the political branches must use a statute to implement, at the domestic level, 
any international agreement that involves economic affairs. Otherwise, the 
mere presence of an international agreement would allow the treatymakers to 
assume the legislative powers so carefully lodged in Article I for Congress. . . 
. Congressional-executive agreements preserve Congress‟s Article I, Section 8 
                                                 
73
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 gives Congress power “To define and punish Piracies 
and Felonies committed on the high Seas,” “To provide for the Punishment of 
counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States.” 
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authority over matters such as international and interstate commerce, 
intellectual property, criminal law, and appropriations, by requiring that 
regardless of the form of the international agreement, Congress‟s participation 
is needed to implement obligations over those areas.
74
 
 
E. USTR’s Justifications do not Establish ACTA’s Constitutional Basis as 
a Sole Executive Agreement 
The USTR has made three assertions justifying entering ACTA as a sole 
executive agreement despite the lack of plenary authority of the President 
over its subject matter. USTR has argued: (1) the agreement will be 
consistent with existing U.S. law; (2) the President has “plenary” powers 
over foreign affairs; and (3) the President is authorized by virtue of the 
Trade Act of 1974. None of these arguments establishes an adequate 
constitutional basis for sole executive action on ACTA. 
The first argument is wrong as a matter of both fact and law. Factually, 
it is not true that ACTA has been crafted in a way to avoid usurpations of 
congressional authority. As noted in the letter of 80 Law Professors to 
President Obama, ACTA fails “to explicitly incorporate current 
congressional policy,” including through provisions that appear to conflict 
with U.S. limitations and exceptions of copyright and trademark law 
damages and injunctions.
75
 ACTA, USTR officials say, is consistent with 
U.S. law because the Administration has reviewed the agreement and not 
seen any problems, and if it is not correct, then ACTA‟s Article 1.2, leaving 
                                                 
74
 Yoo Article, supra note 35 at 56. 
75
 See Letter from Senator Bernard Sanders and Senator Sherrod Brown to David 
Kappos, Director of Patent and Trademark Office (Oct. 19, 2010), available at 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/senator_sanders_brown_kappos_19oct2010.pdf 
(requesting analysis on the potential implications of ACTA on areas of U.S. law that appear 
in conflict with the facial language of the agreement, including in reference to sovereign 
immunity); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999), non-willful trademark violation, 15 U.S.C. § 114 (2), and in certain cases of 
infringement in the digital environment, 17 U.S.C. § 512).  
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each member “free to determine the appropriate method of implementing” 
ACTA, saves any problem.
76
 Regardless of the merits of USTR‟s position 
on the substance of the issue,
77
 the position misses the point. For the 
question of whether ACTA binds U.S., the issue of its compliance with 
present U.S. law is irrelevant. The President does not have authority to enter 
international agreements in Congress‟s arena of enumerated powers without 
congressional consent regardless of whether the agreement‟s provisions 
conform to the contours of existing domestic law. The reason is obvious – 
the agreements would restrain Congress‟s power to alter current law. The 
President cannot so tie Congress‟s hands through unilateral action any more 
than the Congress can pass legislation without the President‟s signature. It 
is Congress, not the executive, which is entitled to reach the decision of 
whether the agreement does in fact comply with the current sense of the 
legislative branch of what the law is and should be.  
USTR‟s second argument – that the President has “plenary” power to 
enter into international intellectual property agreements – is similarly 
misplaced. Here, USTR is drawing on a host of Supreme Court statements 
that the President sometimes acts as the “sole” or “exclusive” representative 
of the United States in the arena of foreign affairs.
78
 Indeed, the specific 
source of USTR‟s rhetoric appears to be the oft cited dicta of the Supreme 
Court in the Curtiss-Wright case, referring to the “very delicate, plenary, 
                                                 
76
 James Love, USTR’s implausible claim that ACTA Article 1.2 is an all purpose 
loophole, and the ramifications if true, KEI (Oct. 22, 2010), http://keionline.org/node/990. 
77
 For a critique, see Id. 
78
 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) 
(describing the President as the “sole organ” in foreign affairs); N.Y. Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 741 (1971) (“[I]t is beyond cavil that the President has broad powers 
by virtue of his primary responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs and his position 
as Commander in Chief.”); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (discussing 
the “conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs, for which the President is exclusively 
responsible”); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948) 
(describing the President as “the Nation‟s organ in foreign affairs”). 
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and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations.”79  
Properly set in their context, the descriptions of the President as the 
“sole” and “plenary” voice in foreign affairs are undoubtedly true. The 
relevant distinction is between the role of the President as the voice and 
negotiator of the U.S. in foreign negotiations, which the executive practices 
unilaterally, and President‟s ability to bind the U.S. to internationally 
constructed laws and policies, in which the “constitutional power over 
foreign affairs is shared by Congress and the President.”80 
The President and his appointees are the sole voice of the U.S. in 
international affairs. The President appoints the U.S. representatives to 
international law making institutions including the United Nations, the 
World Trade Organization and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization. In these capacities, and under the President‟s power to 
“make” treaties and represent the U.S., the executive branch regularly 
engages in the creation of international law and policy.
81
 But such external 
agreements do not bind U.S. domestic law except in the strictly limited 
areas where the President has sole Constitutional authority.
82
 Because 
                                                 
79
 Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 320. 
80
 Itel Containers Intern. Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 85 (1993); see also  Regan 
v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 262 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“It is the responsibility of the 
President and Congress to determine the course of the Nation‟s foreign affairs.”); 
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (discussing “the field of foreign affairs 
which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress”); United States v. 
Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 201 (1926) (“Under the Constitution the treaty-making power 
resides in the President and Senate, and when through their action a treaty is made and 
proclaimed it becomes a law of the United States.”). 
81
 Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003)  (“Nor is there any question 
generally that that there is executive authority to decide what [international] policy should 
be.”). 
82
 See Youngstown, at 635-36 & n.2 (Jackson Concurring) (the President may “act in 
external affairs without Congressional Authority”); Alston at 345 (“[T]he president 
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ACTA involves international legal obligations on Article 1, section 8 
congressional powers, the President cannot bind the U.S. to the agreement 
absent congressional consent.  
Finally, USTR evokes the Trade Act of 1974 as an example of ex ante 
authorization for the President to negotiate trade agreements. This would be 
a cogent argument if fast track legislation was still in place. Fast track 
legislation was a delegation of Congress‟s authority to regulate international 
trade to the executive branch under circumscribed rules (including a final up 
or down vote). But that legislation lapsed. The Trade Act of 1974 does not 
delegate power to the President to bind the U.S. to trade agreements absent 
congressional consent. ACTA, no less than the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
now being negotiated or the Korea, Panama and Peru free trade agreements 
the administration is seeking to bind the U.S. to, must be approved by 
Congress as a regulation of foreign commerce regardless of whether it 
complies with current law.  
IV. ACTA IS A BINDING TREATY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Although the President cannot make domestic law without Congress, he 
can make international law unilaterally.
83
 And although that law cannot 
bind U.S. domestic law without congressional participation, it can bind the 
U.S. in the international sphere.
84
 Non compliance with domestic 
ratification processes not prevent an agreement from creating binding 
                                                                                                                            
requires the consent of Congress as a whole, or two-thirds of the Senate for treaties, to 
transform this external policy into domestic law”). 
83
 See E.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 7, opened for signature 
May 23, 1969 (entered into force January 27, 1980), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
VCLT] (providing that every state has the capacity to conclude international agreements 
and heads of state are presumptively authorized to represent a state for purposes of 
concluding an international agreement); accord Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 
311 (1987) [hereinafter R(3)F]; Van Alstin n. 62 (“Under international law, the president, 
except in extreme circumstances, has the authority to bind the United States even where he 
exceeds his domestic Authority”). 
84
  See Art.26 VCLT. 
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international legal obligations. A state generally “may not invoke a 
violation of its internal law to vitiate its consent to be bound” 
internationally.
85
  
As an international agreement between the negotiating parties, ACTA 
binds all signatories to abide by the framework of this international legal 
instrument.
86
 Parties to an international agreement with binding obligations 
must not derogate from its obligations and must perform them in good faith.  
This doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be kept”) lies at the 
core of the law of international agreements and is embodied in the VCLT 
Art. 26 and in R(3)F § 321.
87
  The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda implies 
the existence of international obligations that must be performed in good 
faith despite restrictions imposed by domestic law.
88
  Accordingly, even 
though ACTA may not be enforceable domestically, it is nonetheless a 
binding international agreement and the parties must perform its obligations 
under ACTA in good faith. 
The existence of a binding obligation in international law leaves parties 
                                                 
85
 Vienna Convention Article 46 (noting that the violation of internal law must be 
“manifest” and concern “a rule of fundamental importance” to evade obligations under 
international law); accord Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, § 311 (3). 
86
 See ACTA November Draft, supra note X at art. 1.2.1 (stating that “[e]ach Party 
shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement”); R(3)F, supra note X at § 301(1) 
(defining “international agreement” as “an agreement between two or more states . . . that 
is intended to be legally binding and is governed by international law.”); 44B Am. Jur. 2d 
International Law (2010) [hereinafter Am Jur] (an “international agreement is a part of 
international law and creates obligations binding between the parties under international 
law”). 
87
 See VCLT, supra note X at art. 26 (emphasizing that “[e]very treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”); R(3)F, supra 
note X at § 321. 
88
 See VCLT, supra note X at art. 27 (stating that “a party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”); R(3)F, 
supra note X at § 321 Comment a (explaining that “international obligations survive 
restrictions imposed by domestic law”).   
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free to decide how they implement the obligations in domestic law, a point 
reflected in ACTA Section A, Article 1.2(1). If the U.S. decides that it does 
not need to take any action to implement ACTA into its law, because 
ACTA does not change the domestic law, then it is up to the other 
contracting parties to identify and enforce any discrepancies between 
ACTA and U.S. law. 
Absent a dispute-resolution mechanism, ACTA lacks a forum for 
enforcement. But that does not mean the agreement lacks binding effect. 
“[U]nder international law, a state that has violated a legal obligation to 
another state is required to terminate the violation and ordinarily make 
reparation, including in appropriate circumstances restitution or 
compensation for loss or injury.”89 In order to resolve disputes, “a state may 
bring a claim against another state for a violation of an international 
obligation . . . either through diplomatic channels” or through an agreed 
procedure.
90
 A party viewing the U.S. in breach of its international 
obligations from ACTA may resort to countermeasures under customary 
international law.
91
 Under these measures, other parties may punish 
violations with ACTA through trade sanctions or other measures against 
U.S. commerce, provided such sanctions are proportional in relation to the 
breach.
92
 Another party could also litigate a case against the U.S. in the 
International Court of Justice,
93
 but that would require the US to submit to 
ICJ jurisdiction.
94
  
There are other implications of the U.S. signing ACTA as binding 
international law. For example, the State Department and USTR would 
                                                 
89
 R(3)F, supra note X at § 901. 
90
 Id. at § 902(1). 
91
 See ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
92
 This is similar to the standard used in WTO dispute settlement. See [WTO Gambling 
case]. 
93
 Cite to jurisdiction of ICJ. 
94
 Thanks and attribution are due to Henning  
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presumably review and craft subsequent international agreements, including 
those intended to bind U.S. law, for compliance with ACTA. ACTA 
provisions, once included in a free trade agreement or other agreement 
approved by Congress, would then have the force of domestic law. Courts 
would be required to interpret ambiguities in U.S. law to comply with more 
specific mandates in ACTA.
95
 And pressure from industry and the 
administration may be brought to bear on Congress on the states to alter 
their law, or refrain from future alterations, to comply with ACTA‟s 
mandates.  
CONCLUSION 
To avoid binding the U.S. to ACTA internationally without 
congressional consent, the Administration needs to make clear in its signing 
of ACTA that the United States does not consider itself to be bound until 
the agreement is consented to by Congress or domestic legislation 
implementing the agreement is passed. Without such a statement, an 
executive signature of ACTA could create a binding international treaty that 
is not considered binding under domestic law.  
 
“Only the U.S. Congress can change U.S. law,” USTR admits.96 
 
                                                 
95
 Charming Betsy. 
96
 Office of the United States Trade Representative www.ustr.gov August 4, 2008 
